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Several recent studies have found a negative relation between government size and economic 
growth in rich countries. Since countries with big government have experienced above average 
improvements in both the Economic freedom index and the KOF globalization index, we argue 
that existing studies suffer from an omitted variable problem. Using Bayesian Averaging over 
Classical Estimates (BACE) in a panel of OECD countries, we show that the negative effect from 
government size is very robust and may have been underestimated in previous studies. The dataset 
is an updated and extended version of the data used by Fölster and Henrekson (2001), covering the 
period 1970-1995. We find clear evidence that globalization has a positive effect on growth, but 
find no effect of economic freedom. Finally, we find that the negative effect of government size 
decreases substantially in size but remains significant when we add the period 1996-2005 to the 
sample. Our results support the idea that countries with big government can use institutional 
quality such as economic freedom and globalization to mitigate negative growth effects of taxes 
and public expenditure. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Several recent studies have identified a negative correlation between government 
size and economic growth in rich countries,  but the robustness of these results has 
been questioned. Furthermore, the good economic performance of the high-tax, 
Scandinavian welfare states after the crisis of the 1990s clearly suggest that our 
understanding of the relationship between government size and economic growth 
is far from complete.  
 
In this paper we show that countries with bigger governments have experienced 
higher average increases in globalization and economic freedom between the 
1970s and 2000. This means that existing studies of the relationship between 
government size and growth in rich countries suffer from an omitted variable bias 
in not controlling for these institutional reforms. Because existing research 
suggest that such reforms are growth promoting, we suggest that high tax welfare 
states can compensate for detrimental effects of big government through 
institutional quality, more specifically economic freedom and globalization. 
We test our hypothesis on a dataset covering rich OECD countries from 1970 to 
2005. The dataset is an updated version of the dataset for the period 1970-1995 
used by Fölster and Henrekson (2001) as well as Agell et al. (2006). We have 
added data from the period 1996 to 2005, as well as the KOF globalization index 
and the Economic freedom index.  We analyze the 1970-1995 and the 1970-2005 
period using simple OLS and using Bayesian Averaging over Classical Estimates 
(BACE) in a panel setting with fixed country and period effects. 
 
In general, our results indicate that there is a robust negative correlation between 
government size (measured as total taxes or expenditure relative to GDP) and 
growth. We also find that globalization as measured by the KOF index is 
positively associated with growth. Compared to the period 1970-1995, the 
negative effect of big government seems to have decreased. In support of our 
‘compensation’ hypothesis, we find that if institutions are not controlled for, a 
simple OLS analysis will actually suggest a positive relation between government 3 
size and growth over the 1970-2005 period. Curiously, the economic freedom 
index is rarely significant in our regressions. 
   
2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1  BIG GOVERNMENT: GROWTH IMPEDING OR A FREE LUNCH? 
The debate regarding the relation between government size and economic 
development has been going on intensively for decades. While scholars such as 
Lindert (2004) and Madrick (2008) argue that the welfare state is “a free lunch” 
(Lindert) and that research supports a “case for big government” (the title of 
Madrick’s book), most studies published in economics journals tend to find a 
negative correlation between government size and growth in rich countries. The 
causal interpretation, however, remains highly debated. 
 
In general, the huge amount of research and the conflicting results are less 
surprising because they reflect different methodological choices regarding which 
countries to include (rich, poor or both), how to measure government size (taxes, 
expenditure or something else) and how to measure economic performance 
(growth, income levels or something else). 
 
In a survey of the literature, Levine and Renelt (1992) conclude that more than 50 
variables have been found to be significantly correlated with growth in at least 
some study. When it comes to the link between growth and the public sector, 
some studies find a strong negative relation while others do not. 
Such conflicting results can now be handled using the so called BACE approach 
developed by Doppelhofer et al. (2004), and described further in section 3. In a 
cross-country study with 88 countries and 67 potential variables for explaining 
average growth rate of GDP per capita between 1960 and 1996, these authors 
identified 18 variables that were successful in the sense that the prior belief that 
these 18 variables belong in the regression was strengthened by the data. Among 
these 18, one was related to government size, namely the share of public 
consumption in GDP in 1961, negatively correlated with growth: Countries with 
10 percent higher public consumption in 1961 had on average 0.44 percentage 4 
units lower annual growth. To put the size of this effect into perspective, note that 
the average public consumption share in 1961 in their sample was 11 percent with 
a standard deviation of 7 percentage points. 
 
Restricting focus to panel studies of rich countries that focus on the relationship 
between aggregate government size (measured as total tax revenue or total 
expenditure relative to GDP) and growth, leaves us with only a few studies, such 
as Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008), Agell et al. (2006) and Fölster and 
Henrekson (2001). 
 
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) study 15 EU countries over the time period 
1960-2001 and find a negative relation between growth and both public 
consumption as well as total government revenue. Similarly, Fölster and 
Henrekson (2001) analyze a sample of rich countries over the 1970-1995 period, 
and find a fairly robust negative correlation for total government expenditure and 
a slightly less robust negative correlation for total tax revenue (both measured as 
GDP shares). These results were questioned by Agell et al. (2006). The 
conclusion from the debate is that the correlation may be less robust when only 
OECD countries are included, and that the direction of causality is hard to 
establish using instrumental variables. 
 
Our paper contributes to this line of research in several ways. First, we note that 
none of the studies mentioned above control for the institutional development, and 
as we demonstrate below, there are reasons to suspect that this affected the results. 
Secondly, we add ten more years of data, 1996-2005 to the dataset used by Fölster 
and Henrekson (2001). Third, we use the BACE algorithm to examine what 
variables are robust in explaining growth. 
 
2.2  THE COMPENSATION HYPOTHESIS – A REINTERPRETATION 
Several authors have suggested that open economies develop larger welfare states 
as a response to the volatility caused by economic openness. This argument is 
often referred to as the compensation hypothesis. Recently, the argument has been 5 
attributed to Rodrik (1997), but its history can be traced to Katzenstein (1985), 
Cameron (1978) and Lindbeck (1975). 
 
A more careful reading of Rodrik (1997), however, reveals no clear link from 
openness to government size. In fact the key factor is external risk rather than 
openness per se.  Recent research has clarified this further: Kim (2007) notes that 
the relationship between economic openness and volatility is “not only 
theoretically ambiguous but empirically moot” (p. 210), and concludes that more 
open economies are not necessarily more volatile (externally or internally). 
Similar findings are presented by Down (2007). 
 
In other words, economic volatility is a mistaken link in understanding the causal 
impact of economic openness on government size.  The idea that more open 
economies need a larger welfare state to compensate for volatility induced by 
exposure to global markets is simply not supported by data. 
 
In this paper, we suggest an alternative compensation hypothesis, by noting that 
countries with higher taxes have on average experienced bigger increases in both 
globalization and economic freedom between 1970 and 2000. If big government is 
not a result of economic openness, perhaps it is the other way round? 
 
In figure 1, we show that countries with bigger government have on average 
experienced larger increases in economic freedom and globalization between 1970 
and 2000. The correlations shown are robust to using expenditure rather than 
taxes as a measure of government size, and to using government size in 1970 or 
2000 rather than average government size during the time period. 
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Figure 1. Increase in index values of globalization (a) and economic freedom (b) compared to 
average tax share of GDP, 1970-2000.  
a                                b  
 
 
In other words: Countries with big government in the 1970s have increased their 
degrees of globalization and economic freedom more than other countries – and 
they still had big government in 2000. 
 
Because several studies have shown both economic freedom and globalization to 
be positively linked to growth, failure to account for institutional reforms will 
cause an omitted variable problem in studies of the relation between government 
size and growth. The studies by Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008), Agell et al. 
(2006) and Fölster and Henrekson (2001) cover more or less the entire time period 
during which these institutional reforms took place without accounting for 
institutional development. 
 
There are reasons for why economic freedom and globalization may be especially 
important for countries with big government. Due to trends like increasing 
mobility of the tax base, globalization has often been depicted as a potential threat 
to the welfare state – see for example Martin and Schumann (1997) and Strange 
(1996). It has often been overlooked that there are several mechanisms through 
which both globalization and economic freedom may positively affect the welfare 
state. Economic openness and free trade create more opportunities for a division 
of labor to arise. With openness comes not only access to new products, but also 7 
access to knowledge and technologies. These two play a fundamental role in 
economic growth according to the so-called ‘endogenous’ or ‘new’ growth theory 
– see Romer (1986) and Romer (1990). 
 
In line with these arguments, Iversen (2005) proposes that big welfare states 
might run into problems if they did not apply a policy of economic openness: 
 
“[…] labor-intensive, low-productivity jobs do not thrive in the context of high 
social protection and intensive labor-market regulation, and without international 
trade countries cannot specialize in high value-added services. Lack of 
international trade and competition, therefore, not the growth of these, is the cause 
of current employment problems in high-protection countries.” [Iversen, p. 74] 
 
According to this view, the negative effects of high transfers, high tax wedges and 
labor-market regulation can at least to some extent be compensated for by 
economic openness, because openness allows welfare states to specialize in high 
value-added services. Recently, Dreher (2006a) surveys the literature and presents 
results based on the KOF index (also used in this paper), showing that 
globalization as measured by the index is in fact positively related to economic 
growth. 
 
A similar reasoning applies to the effect of economic freedom on the welfare 
state. The fundament for prosperity in a market economy is voluntary exchange of 
goods and services, as well as the free exchange of ideas and knowledge. The 
most basic theoretical reason for expecting a negative effect of taxes on economic 
development is that transactions that would take place without taxation, may not 
take place when buyers or sellers in addition to the price they agree upon must 
also pay taxes. 
 
However, from institutional economics (also known as transaction cost 
economics) we know that the price for a good or a service (with or without taxes) 
is only one part of the total cost of a transaction. Other transactions costs include 
for example the costs for buyers and sellers to find each other, to reach an 
agreement and mutually and credibly ensure each other that they will in fact stick 8 
to the agreement they make, and possibly also agree on how to solve potential 
disputes. Well-defined property rights, a functioning legal system and a stable 
currency are factors that lower transaction costs drastically.  
 
Recently, the amount of empirical evidence available on the economic 
consequences of economic freedom has increased drastically. Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu (2006) conduct a meta-study of 52 studies dealing with the impact of 
economic freedom on economic growth, and conclude that “economic freedom 
has a robust positive effect on economic growth regardless of how it is measured” 
(p. 68). 
 
Against this background, a possible re-interpretation of the compensation 
hypothesis is the following: Countries do not develop big welfare states as a result 
of volatility induced by globalization. However, they can use institutional reforms 
to promote economic freedom and globalization, and by this avoid or mitigate the 
negative effects of big government. 
 
If our re-interpretation of the compensation hypothesis is correct, including the 
KOF globalization index and the economic freedom index when analyzing the 
relation between growth and government size will reveal a more robust negative 
relation between government size and growth, while the indexes themselves 
should be positively related to growth. We may even expect globalization and 
economic freedom to be especially important for growth in countries with big 
government. 
 
Before we continue with empirical testing, one question deserves some attention: 
Why have countries with big government on average increased economic freedom 
and globalization more than countries with smaller government? Clearly, nothing 
prevents countries with less extensive welfare states to imitate these policies. 
An important observation is that several high-tax countries had very low levels of 
economic freedom and globalization in the 1970s. This is part of the explanation 
why big increases have been possible. We further believe that the concept of state 
capacity is relevant – see Skocpol (1990).  Countries with a high degree of state 
capacity will be more effective than others in all their activities – including 9 
regulations during the 1970s and deregulations during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Hence, the ability of the Scandinavian welfare states to reform their institutions 
may well be related to the same factors that enable them to collect high taxes and 
provide a wide range of public services. 
 
We now turn to our empirical analysis of the relation between government size, 
institutions and growth. 
   
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, we empirically analyze both the long (1970-2005) and the short 
(1970-1995) time period. The data set we use in an updated version of the data set 
used in Fölster and Henrekson (2001), which was kindly provided to us by the 
authors. This has been updated to cover the time period 1970 to 2005 and covers 
25 OECD countries and Taiwan.  We have also added the economic freedom 
index and the KOF globalization index.  The appendix contains a complete 
description of the data and its sources. All values are 5-year averages, unless 
explicitly stated otherwise. 
 
3.1  POOLED REGRESSIONS 
Table 1 shows the results from a pooled OLS regression on 5-year averages over 
the period 1970-1995. The control variables are the same as those used in Fölster 
and Henrekson (2001). Column one and two show the results without controlling 
for globalization and economic freedom, column three and four includes the levels 
of the indices, and column five and six includes interaction terms: KOFG is 
defined as KOF*TAX in column (5) and KOF*GEXP in column (6). 10 
Table 1. Pooled OLS. Period: 1970-1995. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TAX -0.0400*** -0.0344* -0.0404
0.0152 0.0174 0.0704
GEXP -0.0469*** -0.0509*** -0.0373
0.0114 0.0135 0.0441
Y0 -0.0192*** -0.0200*** -0.0324*** -0.0320*** -0.0288*** -0.0296***
0.00485 0.00460 0.00644 0.00616 0.00676 0.00657
INV 0.0901*** 0.0645** 0.0933*** 0.0691*** 0.0977*** 0.0721***
0.0262 0.0260 0.0257 0.0254 0.0257 0.0256
DHUM 0.0298 0.0163 0.0437 0.0251 0.0419 0.0236
0.0776 0.0757 0.0757 0.0739 0.0755 0.0742
DLAB 0.294** 0.255** 0.269** 0.200 0.262** 0.188
0.129 0.121 0.130 0.121 0.129 0.125
KOF 0.00635* 0.00853** -0.00783 -0.000363
0.00355 0.00346 0.00891 0.00875
EFI 0.00109 -0.00111 0.00644 0.00325





R2 0.480 0.531 0.514 0.562 0.526 0.567
N 139 133 139 133 139 133  
 
 
The results suggest that just by running a pooled OLS on 5 year averages, we find 
a negative effect of government size, measured both using TAX and GEXP. 
Including KOF and EFI, changes little, but reveals a positive effect from 
globalization with some significance. Including interaction terms between the 
institutional indices and government size, we find for the specification with TAX 
as the dependent variable, that globalization is good for growth in ‘big 
government’ countries only; or, conversely, that big government is harmful to 
growth in non-globalised countries only. The results for the GEXP variables (6) 
are similar albeit not statistically significant. This gives some support to Iversen’s 
(2005) view mentioned above, but in general, the results are ambiguous. 
 
Table 2 shows what happens when we add the period 1996 to 2005 to the analysis. 
As shown in columns 1 and 2, not controlling for EFI and KOF may actually lead 
to the conclusion that government expenditure is positively correlated with 
growth. This result remains when we include levels of KOF and EFI, but changes 11 
when we also include interaction terms – which actually produce a negative effect 
of TAX on growth. Interestingly, EFI has a weak negative effect while EFIG is 
positive, again providing some support for the compensation hypothesis. 
 
Table 2 Pooled OLS. Period: 1970-2005. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TAX 0.0141 0.00965 -0.263**
0.0173 0.0180 0.119
GEXP 0.0216** 0.0199** 0.0601
0.00861 0.00870 0.0510
Y0 -0.0197*** -0.0196*** -0.0219*** -0.0236*** -0.0164*** -0.0234***
0.00434 0.00495 0.00527 0.00568 0.00568 0.00569
INV 0.0814** 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.129*** 0.105*** 0.111***
0.0329 0.0307 0.0360 0.0345 0.0359 0.0363
DHUM -0.0815 -0.0756 -0.0662 -0.0514 -0.0712 -0.0542
0.0890 0.0942 0.0904 0.0954 0.0893 0.0951
DLAB 0.508*** 0.496*** 0.474*** 0.480*** 0.435*** 0.507***
0.125 0.124 0.127 0.125 0.127 0.127
KOF 0.00296 0.00298 -0.00333 -0.00387
0.00209 0.00207 0.00668 0.00556
EFI -0.000673 0.000202 -0.0118* 0.00611





R2 0.299 0.293 0.308 0.306 0.335 0.320
N 161 159 161 159 161 159  
 
 
In short, the pooled regressions indicate the following: firstly, the relationship 
between government size and growth is not robust to different specifications. 
Including the two institutional indices KOF and EFI affect the sign and size of the 
government size variable. Secondly, the two indices interact with government size 
in an interesting manner, suggesting that the effects of government size on growth 
depend on the degree of globalisation and economic freedom – or conversely, that 
the effects of globalisation and economic freedom depend on the size of 
government. 
 
We have thus shown that simple OLS regressions can yield estimates of the 
government size effect with different results regarding both sign and significance, 12 
depending on the time period and what control variables are included. This is 
indeed nothing new, but rather exactly what was to be expected. We therefore 
apply the BACE algorithm to examine what variables are more robust in 
explaining growth in our sample. 
 
3.2  BAYESIAN AVERAGING OF CLASSICAL ESTIMATES 
The estimates presented so far were based on a certain model, assuming that a 
fixed number of independent variables should be included. However, in reality 
there is model uncertainty as there is a large number of variables which can 
potentially be relevant for explaining economic growth. In order to account for 
this problem, we applied the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) 
approach developed by Doppelhofer et al (2004). 
 
The BACE approach is useful when the researcher is unable to specify prior 
beliefs concerning the probabilities of different models – maybe due to too many 
possible variables being considered. The outcome of the estimation is a posterior 
probability assigned to each possible model, which is based on the limit as the 
relative variance of the prior density approaches infinity. Taking this limit, and 
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Where  ( ) y M P j  is the posterior probability of model Mj given the dataset y, 
( ) j M P  is the prior probability assigned to model Mj, T is the sample size, kj is the 
number of variables included in model Mj, and SSEj is the sum of squared errors 
in model Mj. 
 
Our dataset contains a total of 17-21 variables – depending on whether subindices 
of the economic freedom index are used or not. This means we can estimate all 
the 2K possible models and need not rely on the sampling algorithm used by 
Doppelhofer et al (2004). In total, we considered 12 different specifications for 
the BACE algorithm. Firstly, we allowed the prior expectation concerning the 13 
model size vary between 3 and 7 additional variables apart from fixed country and 
time effects. Secondly, the variables GEXP and TAX are highly collinear so we 
used them in separate specifications, thus providing additional sensitivity analysis. 
Finally, we carried out separate estimations with and without the subindices of the 
EFI index. Hence, we carried out 12 different estimations in total. As a sensitivity 
analysis, we allowed the prior inclusion probabilities to vary and estimated all 
models for an expected model size of three and seven variables, respectively. 
These results are available from the authors upon request, but they do not produce 
qualitatively different results from these presented in the following. 
 
BACE RESULTS, SHORT SAMPLE  
Results from our baseline model applied to data from 1970-1995 are presented in 
Table 3. Fixed country and time effects are suppressed, since these variables were 
included in each specification. In column one, the posterior inclusion probability 
is reported, i.e. the probability a variable should be included in the model 
according to equation (1) above. Column 2 reports the estimated mean of the 
parameter, conditional on inclusion and column 3 reports the corresponding 
standard deviation. Column 4 reports the sign certainty probability and the three 
last columns report the corresponding OLS estimates for a model where all 17 
variables have been included. 
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Table 3. BACE-analysis, Taxes and growth. Period: 1970-1995. Prior model size: 5. 
 
According to our estimates, four independent variables increase their inclusion 
probability compared with the prior probability (at 29.4 per cent). Initial GDP 
seems to be the strongest one, followed by the fertility rate, the tax burden and the 
dependent population. The ranking is similar for the sign certainty probability. 
Compared to OLS estimates, we find that three of the selected variables fail to be 
significant even at the ten per cent level, whereas Exports and Imports, which are 
significant according to classical OLS estimates, fail to qualify according to the 
BACE estimator. 
 
Our two main variables of interest, the globalization index KOF and the economic 
freedom index EFI, are both amongst the least significant variables according to 
the BACE estimates. 
 
Next, in Table 4, we report estimates when we have replaced the total tax burden 
with overall government expenditure as our measure of government size. The 
results are similar to those in Table 5 above in most relevant aspects. However, 
five different variables now increase their inclusion probability compared with the 
baseline. These are: initial GDP, government expenditure, the fertility rate, the 




















Estimate           
(5) 
OLS p-






1  Y0  0.999  -0.068873  0.016133  1.000  -0.083  0.000  1.00 
2  FERT  0.761  -0.014611  0.005265  0.877  -0.008  0.123  0.88 
3  TAX  0.656  -0.130101  0.049746  0.823  -0.070  0.217  0.82 
4  DEPPOP  0.488  -0.192652  0.085117  0.737  -0.143  0.121  0.74 
5  URBAN  0.247  0.092213  0.051348  0.614  0.123  0.034  0.61 
6  UNEMPL  0.226  -0.087050  0.049816  0.603  -0.073  0.186  0.60 
7  EXP  0.173  0.063953  0.046324  0.577  0.091  0.035  0.58 
8  DHUM  0.159  0.107726  0.069598  0.569  0.082  0.310  0.57 
9  IMP  0.129  -0.060154  0.044799  0.550  -0.074  0.084  0.55 
10  TYR  0.069  0.002654  0.002797  0.523  -0.001  0.815  0.50 
11  SAV  0.065  0.041660  0.043864  0.521  0.028  0.537  0.52 
12  POP  0.064  0.000000  0.000000  0.504  0.000  0.365  0.50 
13  DLAB  0.054  0.111977  0.142391  0.515  0.139  0.330  0.52 
14  INV  0.050  0.017956  0.054751  0.509  0.022  0.671  0.51 
15  EFI  0.041  0.000064  0.001977  0.504  0.001  0.634  0.50 
16  INFL  0.039  -0.002008  0.007129  0.504  -0.003  0.665  0.50 
17  KOF  0.037  0.002695  0.010491  0.504  -0.002  0.870  0.50 
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degree of urbanization, and the dependent population. Moreover, the ‘government 
expenditure’ variable seems to have stronger explanatory power than the tax 
burden variable according to most indicators. This might be due to the fact that 
reverse causality is potentially a problem for this variable. 
 




Again, two of the selected variables – fertility and dependent population – are 
insignificant at the ten per cent level according to OLS estimates. On the other 
hand, the exports variable is significant at the ten per cent level but has an 
inclusion probability lower than the baseline. Finally, the two institutional indices 
are insignificant according to BACE. 
 
  




















Estimate           
(5) 
OLS p-






1  Y0  1.000  -0.070745  0.014591  1.000  -0.088  0.000  1.00 
2  GEXP  1.000  -0.115565  0.026075  1.000  -0.101  0.004  1.00 
3  FERT  0.870  -0.012850  0.004372  0.933  -0.008  0.115  0.93 
4  URBAN  0.403  0.100780  0.049073  0.693  0.143  0.012  0.69 
5  DEPPOP  0.197  -0.125016  0.075047  0.589  -0.112  0.195  0.59 
6  EXP  0.165  0.043150  0.034115  0.572  0.073  0.071  0.57 
7  DHUM  0.161  0.100947  0.064938  0.570  0.101  0.191  0.57 
8  IMP  0.079  -0.034704  0.038650  0.524  -0.057  0.153  0.52 
9  UNEMPL  0.077  -0.052190  0.047941  0.528  -0.052  0.327  0.53 
10  INFL  0.062  0.006234  0.006738  0.520  0.004  0.563  0.52 
11  TYR  0.047  0.001338  0.002722  0.510  -0.002  0.500  0.50 
12  EFI  0.041  0.000518  0.001777  0.506  0.001  0.500  0.51 
13  INV  0.041  -0.000170  0.042575  0.503  0.011  0.820  0.50 
14  SAV  0.038  0.011964  0.041656  0.504  0.006  0.886  0.50 
15  POP  0.037  0.000000  0.000000  0.500  0.000  0.784  0.50 
16  DLAB  0.036  -0.003452  0.135487  0.501  0.028  0.842  0.50 
17  KOF  0.035  0.001109  0.009720  0.502  0.000  0.967  0.50 
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BACE RESULTS, LONG SAMPLE  
The two following tables repeat the analysis for the longer 1970-2005 time period. 
Interestingly, a different set of variables now increase their inclusion probability. 
The estimated correlation between government size and growth remains but is 
substantially reduced in its size. 
 
Table 5. BACE-analysis. Taxes and growth. Period 1970-2005. Prior model size: 5. 

















Estimate           
(5)
OLS p-






1 TAX    1.000 -0.043018 0.040572 0.855 -0.050 0.255 0.86
2 Y0     1.000 -0.066052 0.009976 1.000 -0.072 0.000 1.00
3 SAV    0.997 0.175188 0.035638 0.998 0.092 0.105 1.00
4 INFL   0.980 -0.074556 0.021551 0.990 -0.072 0.003 0.99
5 DLAB   0.969 0.360027 0.108059 0.984 0.300 0.012 0.98
6 KOF    0.332 0.011972 0.005946 0.658 0.008 0.166 0.66
7 FERT   0.293 -0.007366 0.003905 0.638 -0.011 0.015 0.64
8 UNEMPL 0.170 -0.085290 0.052530 0.576 -0.079 0.179 0.58
9 EXP    0.147 0.032794 0.028457 0.564 0.080 0.116 0.56
10 pop    0.087 0.000000 0.000000 0.505 0.000 0.352 0.51
11 DHUM   0.083 -0.087888 0.074720 0.531 -0.142 0.074 0.53
12 IMP    0.075 0.012642 0.050118 0.524 -0.072 0.260 0.50
13 URBAN  0.064 -0.036790 0.041565 0.520 -0.062 0.134 0.52
14 DEPPOP 0.061 0.064313 0.078305 0.518 0.111 0.162 0.52
15 INV    0.049 0.034537 0.058636 0.511 0.088 0.200 0.51
16 TYR    0.038 0.000533 0.001777 0.505 0.002 0.249 0.50
17 EFI 0.038 0.000394 0.003094 0.503 0.001 0.863 0.50
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Estimate           
(5)
OLS p-






1 GEXP 1.000 -0.035853 0.029099 0.891 -0.021 0.524 0.89
2 Y0     1.000 -0.064350 0.009936 1.000 -0.072 0.000 1.00
3 SAV    0.994 0.160908 0.038701 0.997 0.086 0.144 1.00
4 INFL   0.973 -0.072313 0.021151 0.986 -0.069 0.004 0.99
5 DLAB   0.925 0.333581 0.108968 0.961 0.294 0.014 0.96
6 KOF    0.362 0.012263 0.005934 0.674 0.009 0.151 0.67
7 FERT   0.219 -0.006585 0.003809 0.601 -0.010 0.024 0.60
8 EXP    0.140 0.032946 0.029345 0.561 0.083 0.103 0.56
9 UNEMPL 0.126 -0.080441 0.055584 0.554 -0.084 0.178 0.55
10 pop    0.086 0.000000 0.000000 0.505 0.000 0.305 0.51
11 DHUM   0.078 -0.084965 0.074766 0.529 -0.138 0.085 0.53
12 IMP    0.072 0.009877 0.052066 0.522 -0.075 0.248 0.50
13 DEPPOP 0.056 0.058468 0.076063 0.515 0.101 0.202 0.52
14 URBAN  0.050 -0.025445 0.040554 0.512 -0.053 0.194 0.51
15 INV    0.046 0.031798 0.059649 0.510 0.077 0.254 0.51
16 TYR    0.042 0.000882 0.001823 0.508 0.002 0.276 0.51
17 EFI 0.038 0.000350 0.003093 0.502 0.000 0.928 0.50
  
 
3.3 SUMMARY AND COMPARISON WITH EXISTING RESEARCH 
Having run the BACE algorithm on both the short (1970-1995) and the long time 
(1970-2005) period, using both tax revenue and public expenditure as measures of 
government size we find that there are three variables that very robustly correlate 
with growth: TAX, GEXP and Y0. We emphasize that this holds true also for a 
prior model size of 3 and 7 variables. In addition to these, there are four additional 
variables that increase their inclusion probability in the longer sample (also 
regardless of model size): Globalization (KOF), savings (SAV) and labor force 
growth (DLAB) all have positive coefficients, while inflation (INFL) is negatively 
correlated with growth. 
 
So far, our results indicate that government size is negatively correlated with 
growth and that globalization probably is good for growth. But part of our 
hypothesis was that existing research suffered from an omitted variable bias when 
not controlling for institutions. If correct, we should be able to see that the size of 
the negative effect from government size on growth is bigger in our study than in 18 
earlier studies. In table 7 we compare our estimates to those obtained by other 
scholars.  
 
Table 7. Comparison of coefficients in growth regressions for some recent comparable studies.  
Study  Coefficient on TAX  Coefficient on GEXP 
Our study 
(BACE, OECD, 1970-1995). 
-.13  -.12 
Our study,  
(BACE, OECD, 1970-2005). 
-.043  -.036 
Fölster and Henrekson (2001) 
(Fixed effects panel, OECD, 1970-
1995). Table 2. 
-0.05 (not sig.)  -0.07 (sig. at 5%) 
Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) 
(Fixed effects panel, EU countries, 
1960-2001). Table 5. 
-0,06 to -0,07 (sig. at 
5% or 1%) 
-0.05 (sig. at 1%) 
Dar and AmirKhalkhali (2002)
1 
(random effects panel, 19 OECD, 
1971-1999). Table 3. 
 
n.a.  Significant negative effects 
in 16 of 19 countries: from 
-0.05 in Finland and 




This comparison suggest two things: First, our coefficients for the period 1970 to 
1995 are approximately twice as big as those obtained by Fölster and Henrekson 
(2001). Given that the only difference between our study and theirs is the use of 
BACE and allowing inclusion of institutional indices, this clearly support our idea 
that the omission of institutional quality in their study lead to a bias. Our 
coefficients are also bigger than those obtained in Romero-Avila and Strauch 
(2008), though here differs also the sample and the time period studied. 
 
Secondly, we find that the size of the negative effect is much smaller when the 
long panel is considered. This can be interpreted as evidence that the negative 
effects from big government on growth still apply – but the size has decreased 
substantially. This interesting result is consistent with  Dar and AmirKhalkhali 
(2002), who show that size of government has a statistically signiﬁcant negative 
impact on total factor productivity growth through the 1970s and 1980s – but not 
during the 1990s.  
 
                                                 
1 For 3 of 19 countries in these study, the authors report a non-significant relation: 
Negative but unsignificant in Norway and Sweden, positive but insignificant in US. 
2 In US, the coefficient 19 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that existing studies of the relation between government size and 
growth in rich countries suffer from an omitted variable problem by not 
accounting for institutional quality such as economic freedom and globalization – 
both areas where countries with big government have experienced above average 
increases during the 1980s and the 1990s. Using the BACE-algorithm, we have 
shown that the negative correlation between government size and growth is robust 
to including the economic freedom index and the KOF globalization index in the 
empirical analysis, and we have found some support for a modified version of 
compensation hypothesis, according to which countries with big government 
compensate negative effects of big government with institutional quality. 
 
Using the same data set as Fölster and Henrekson (1999), we obtained a stronger 
negative correlation between government size and growth by using the BACE-
algorithm and allowing the inclusion of institutional quality as measured by the 
indices. We also found globalization to be positively related to growth during the 
longer time period 1970-2005, and that the negative correlation between 
government size and growth decreased substantially during the 1990s. 
 
Our results are not without question marks. A simple OLS analysis produced 
rather unclear results. More surprising is perhaps that we failed to find positive 
effects of the economic freedom index when using BACE.  A closer examination 
of our data reveals that several of the countries have identical index values for 
economic freedom for several consecutive years. This limits the variation in our 
sample, and is a good candidate for explaining the lack of clear results. On the 
other hand, the KOF index actually does better than imports and exports in the 
BACE-analysis, indicating that the index captures globalization in a broader sense 
that better explains growth.  
 
It bears emphasizing that the economic freedom index was developed mainly to 
make possible worldwide comparisons of institutions in countries ranging from 
completely planned economies to highly capitalist societies. Most likely, this 
index does not work equally well when it comes to capturing institutional 
differences among the richest countries in the western civilization. 20 
Another plausible and related explanation for the lack of clear results is that 
institutional reforms affect growth with a substantial time lag. The channels 
through which economic freedom and globalization affect growth are easy to 
describe in a cross-country setting: Stable property rights, a stable currency and 
low transaction costs all clearly promote economic exchange and investments. But 
how much time is required for institutional changes to affect the economy in a 
particular country? Clearly, this time span may is likely to be long, and it may 
well differ between countries. Furthermore, the size of the effect should vary 
depending on whether the change is perceived to be permanent or temporary. 
None of these factors are captured by the index. 
 
Finally, it is plausible that institutional reforms towards higher degrees of 
economic freedom and globalization have different effects in the long and the 
short term. It is reasonable to expect that the positive effects of institutional 
reforms towards economic freedom comes at a short term cost, when the country 
has been characterised by low economic freedom for a long time – similar to 
Ralph Dahrendorf’s well-known ‘valley of tears’-argument. To handle such 
issues, it is probably advisable to replace the 5-year average approach by using 
yearly data, and take the endogeneity problem more explicitly into account, 
preferably by finding good instruments for potentially endogenous variables such 
as the tax ratio.  
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
DGDP 159 0,024 0,016 -0,012 0,086 Period growth in GDP, annual rate.
TAX 159 0,349 0,078 0,132 0,519 Total tax revenues in proportion to GDP
GEXP 159 0,420 0,133 0,000 0,695 Total government expenditure in proportion to GDP
Y0 159 1,046 0,245 0,220 2,005 Initial relative GDP per capita (OECD=1)
INV 159 0,228 0,040 0,165 0,372 Gross Fixed Capital Formation in proportion to GDP
DHUM 159 0,011 0,012 -0,013 0,063 Annual growth of average years of schooling
DLAB 159 0,012 0,009 -0,011 0,049 Annual growth in total labour force
DEPPOP 159 0,346 0,028 0,282 0,454 Population aged 0-15 and 65as a fraction of total population
EXP 159 0,338 0,210 0,071 1,457 Exports of goods and services as a fraction of GDP
FERT 159 1,795 0,416 1,180 4,012 Fertility rate, total (births per woman)
IMP 159 0,332 0,179 0,069 1,251 Import of goods and services as a fraction of GDP
INFL 159 0,067 0,068 -0,004 0,494 Inflation consumer prices (annual %)
OPEN 159 0,671 0,387 0,140 2,709 The sum of EXP and IMP
POP 159 36 008 54 986 212 290 913 Total population (thousands)
SAV 158 0,230 0,063 0,135 0,503 Gross National Saving in proportion to GDP
TYR 159 8,448 1,901 2,790 12,250 Average years of schooling
UNEMPL 159 0,060 0,034 0,003 0,162 Unemployment as a proportion of the labor force
URBAN 159 0,736 0,122 0,420 0,972 Urban population as a fraction of total population
KOF 159 3,128 0,768 1,451 5,381 KOF globalization index.
EFI 159 6,488 0,764 3,970 8,200 Economic freedom index22 
 
Variable  Definition  Source 
DGDP  Average annual growth rate  OECD3 WDI, IMF1, 
TAX  Total tax revenue as a share of GDP, current 
prices 
OECD4,WDI, IMF1 
GEXP  Government Expenditure, share of GDP  OECD2 
Y0  Initial GDP per capita in current prices and 
PPPs.  OECD = 1. Initial GDP is the initial 
OECD1, WDI, Taiwan from PWT 
INV  Investment,  share of GDP, current prices.  OECD1, IMF1 
DHUM  Annual growth rate of average years of 
schooling 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
DLAB  Average annual growth rate of the labor force.  OECD2, WDI 
DEPOP  Population aged 0-15 and 65- as a share of 
total population. 
WDI 
EXP  Export of goods and services as a fraction of 
GDP, current prices. 
WDI, IMF1 
IMP  Import of goods and services as a fraction of 
GDP, current prices. 
WDI, IMF1 
OPEN  The sum of EXP and IMP.  WDI, IMF1 
FERT  Fertility rate, births per woman.  WDI 
INFL  Annual percentage change in the consumer 
price index.   
WDI, Taiwan, Germany from IMF2 
POP  Total population.  WDI, Taiwan PWT 
SAV  Gross national saving share of GDP, current 
prices.  
OECD1 
PSAV  Gross private saving as a fraction of GDP, 
current prices. 
OECD2 
TYR  Average years of schooling in the total 
population. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
UNEMPL  Unemployment as a share of the labor force.  OECD2, WDI 
URBAN  Urban population as a fraction of total 
population. 
WDI 
KOF  Globalization index  Dreher (2006b) 
EFI  Economic freedom index  Gwartney et al. (2008) 
 
Publications 
Taiwan Statistical Yearbook, 2007, issued by Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
Taiwan. 
IMF1 = IMF, International Financial Statistics, October 2006, CD-rom. 
 
Online Databases 
IMF2 = IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 and September 2000. 
OECD1 = OECD, National Accounts Main Aggregates – detailed tables, Vol. 2007, release 01 
OECD2 = OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 2007, release 01. 
OECD3 = OECD, National Accounts Main Aggregates – comparative tables, Vol. 2007, release 02. 
OECD4 = OECD Revenue Statistics, Vol 2006, release 01. 
PWT = Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
September 2006. 
WDI = World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators 23 
The Areas and Components of the Economic Freedom Index 
1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 
A. General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption. 
B. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP. 
C. Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP. 
D. Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies). 
i.  Top marginal income tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies) 
ii.  Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies) 
 
2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
A. Judicial independence: the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government or 
parties in disputes. 
B. Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of 
government actions or regulation. 
C. Protection of intellectual property. 
D. Military interference in rule of law and the political process. 
E. Integrity of the legal system. 
 
3: Access to Sound Money 
A. Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of real 
GDP in the last ten years 
B. Standard inflation variability in the last five years.  
C. Recent inflation rate. 
D. Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad. 
 
4: Freedom to Trade Internationally 
A.  Taxes on international trade. 
i. Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports. 
ii. Mean tariff rate. 
iii. Standard deviation of tariff rates. 
B.   Regulatory trade barriers. 
i. Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas. 
ii. Costs of importing: the combined effect of import tariffs, licence fees, bank fees, and the time required for 
administrative red-tape raises costs of importing  equipment by (10 = 10% or less; 0 = more than 50%). 
 
C. Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size. 
D. Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate. 
E. International capital market controls 
i. Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets.  
ii. Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners—index of 
capital controls among 13 IMF categories. 
 
5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 
A. Credit Market Regulations 
i. Ownership of banks: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks. 
ii. Competition: domestic banks face competition from foreign banks. 
iii. Extension of credit: percentage of credit extended to private sector.  
iv. Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real interest rates. 
v. Interest rate controls: interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are freely determined by the 
market. 
B. Labor Market Regulations 
i. Impact of minimum wage: the minimum wage, set by law, has little impact on wages because it is too low 
or not obeyed. 
ii. Hiring and firing practices: hiring and firing practices of companies are determined by private contract. 
iii. Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining. 
iv. Unemployment Benefits: the unemployment benefits system preserves the incentive to work. 
v. Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel 
C. Business Regulations 
i. Price controls: extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices. 
ii. Administrative conditions and new businesses: administrative procedures are an important obstacle to 
starting a new business. 
iii. Time with government bureaucracy: senior management spends a substantial amount of time dealing with 
government bureaucracy. 
iv. Starting a new business: starting a new business is generally easy. 
v. Irregular payments: irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits, business 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan applications are very rare. 
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The KOF Index of Globalization.  
 
A.Economic Globalization  
 
i) Actual Flows  
Trade (percent of GDP) 
Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent of GDP) 
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP) 
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP) 
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP) 
 
ii) Restrictions 
Hidden Import Barriers 
Mean Tariff Rate 
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) 




i) Data on Personal Contact 
Outgoing Telephone Traffic 
Transfers (percent of GDP) 
International Tourism 
Foreign Population (percent of total population) 
International letters (per capita) 
 
ii) Data on Information Flows 
Internet Hosts (per 1000 people) 
Internet Users (per 1000 people) 
Cable Television (per 1000 people) 
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) 
Radios (per 1000 people) 
 
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity 
Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita) 
Number of Ikea (per capita) 




Embassies in Country 
Membership in International Organizations 
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions 
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